

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-15 USIA-12 NEA-10

GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 IO-12 OIC-04 AEC-11

ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /153 W
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P 211920 Z MAY 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 171

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2965

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2490

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: MAY 21 INFORMAL NAC ON U. S. OPTIONS

HELSINKI FOR USDEL MPT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

BEGIN SUMMARY: RUMSFELD (U. S.) EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ALLIES WOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF PRESENCE OF EXPERTS THROUGH MAY 24 TO MOVE CLOSER TO CONSENSUS ON MBFR OUTCOMES. AMONG QUESTIONS RAISED PRINCIPALLY BY BELGIAN, FRG, UK, ITALIAN AND CANADIAN PERMREPS WERE: TIMESPAN FORESEEN BY U. S. FOR MBFR PROCESS, AND DEFINITION OF " LIMITED OBJECTIVES"; WHETHER STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS CUTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED SIMULTANEOUSLY BUT IMPLEMENTED SEPARATELY; RATIONALE FOR 10 PERCENT CRITERION FOR MAXIMUM ALLIED
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REDUCTIONS; MILITARY MEASURES THAT ALLIES MIGHT TAKE TO OFFSET EFFECTS OF OUTCOMES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR HOW TO FILL GAP ON ALLIED FRONT THAT WOULD BE LEFT IF U. S. FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN AS IN SECOND OPTION; DATA DISCREPANCIES; AND BASIS FOR ASSESS-

MENTS IN ANNEXES ON FORCE LIMITATION AND NUCLEAR ASPECTS. CANADIAN PERMREP CALLED FOR FURTHER STUDY OF SOVIET AIMS IN MBFR; DUTCH PERMREPS SAID ALLIES COULD NOT IGNORE NEGOTIABILITY IN SELECTING AN OUTCOME. RUMSFELD ONCE AGAIN EXPLAINED U. S. VIEW THAT ALLIES SHOULD FIRST SEEK AGREEMENT ON AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME IN MILITARY SECURITY TERMS, THEN BEGIN CONSTRUCTION OF A NEGOTIATING APPROACH DESIGNED TO SELL ALLIED PREFERENCES TO SOVIETS. NAC AGREED TO CONSIDER SPC DRAFT ON GUIDELINES (USNATO 2461 AND 2462) AT MAY 23 MEETING AND TO RETURN TO DISCUSSION OF KISSINGER'S "YEAR OF EUROPE" SPEECH AT MAY 25 MEETING. SPC WILL MEET WITH MBFR WORKING GROUP REPS AND EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS AFTERNOON MAY 21 AND IF NECESSARY ON MAY 22. U. S. EXPERTS WILL MEET PRIVATELY WITH OTHERS BILATERALLY OR MULTILATERALLY ON COMPLETION OF FORMAL MEETINGS ON U. S. PAPER. END SUMMARY

1. ACTING SYG PANSA OPENED DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT PERMREPS RESTRICT DISCUSSION AT THIS MEETING TO PREFERRED OUTCOMES AND A DECISION ON WHEN NAC SHOULD CONSIDER GUIDELINES.

2. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD THEN INTRODUCED EXPERTS, NOTING THAT U. S. INTENTION WAS TO USE SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS THIS WEEK BETWEEN EXPERTS AND NAC, SPC, WORKING GROUP AND OTHER NATIONAL EXPERTS BILATERALLY OR TRILATERALLY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON PREFERRED MBFR OUTCOME. HOPEFULLY, VARIOUS EXPERTS SESSIONS COULD PROVIDE KIND OF INFORMATION AND ANSWERS NAC WOULD NEED TO CONDUCT INSTRUCTED DISCUSSION ON OUTCOMES AND MOVE FORWARD TO A DECISION IN THIS AREA. HE POINTED OUT THAT DISCUSSION OF OUTCOMES WAS DIFFERENT FROM, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE NOT EASILY SEPARABLE FROM THE QUESTION OF GUIDELINES AND PREPARATION OF A NEGOTIATING POSITION, AND URGED THAT THE PRESENCE OF EXPERTS BE USED FOR THE FORMER PURPOSE. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED THAT PERMREPS AND DELEGATIONS USE THE TIME FOR PUTTING QUESTIONS ON TECHNICAL CONTENT AND NOTED THAT THE U. S. TEAM WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO ANSWER POLICY QUESTIONS. TO THE EXTENT THAT U. S. POLICY HAD BEEN
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FORMULATED ON ANY POINT, IT APPEARED IN THE U. S. PAPER OF APRIL 30, AND IN PREVIOUS NAC STATEMENTS. THIS POINT WAS REITERATED BY BAKER (US) WHO NOTED THAT U. S. EXPERTS COULD DO NO MORE THAN CLARIFY, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, TECHNICAL CONTENT OF U. S. PAPER AND THAT NO POLICY IMPLICATIONS, BEYOND WHAT ALREADY APPEARED IN THE U. S. PAPER, SHOULD BE INFERRED FROM ANY OBSERVATIONS BY THE U. S. TEAM.

3. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) LED OFF QUESTIONING BY EXPRESSING CONCERN ON CURRENT PROCEDURE IN VIENNA. HE NOTED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SMALL GROUP DISCUSSION OF AGENDA RESULTED IN INCLUSION OF ALL FOUR WARSAW PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BUT NOT ALL NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS

AND NONE OF THE NATO FLANK STATES. HE WARNED AGAINST THIS KIND OF FOUR- CLUNTRY " DIRECTORATE" AND URGED ADOPTION OF THE HELSINKI APPROACH USING AN OPEN- ENDED GROUP, ASSUMING THAT EXCLUSIVE USE OF PLENARIES, WHICH HIS AUTHORITIES PRE- FERRED, WAS NOT POSSIBLE. TURNING TO MBFR GUIDELINES, DE STAERCKE OBSERVED THAT THE SPC TEXT (USNATO 2461) WAS " EXCELLENT" AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT IT AS IS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO MINISTERS IN COPENHAGEN. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BELGIUM WOULD HAVE A FEW CHANGES TO SUGGEST IF OTHERS SOUGHT TO INTRODUCE CHANGES. HON U. S. MBFR APPROACHES, DE. STAERCKE CAUTIONED ON THREE POINTS: (1) THERE SHOULD BE NO APPEARANCE OF U. S.- SOVIET TETE A TETE ARRANGEMENTS AS APPEARED TO BE CALLED FOR UNDER OPTION II; (2) BELGIAN OFFICIALS AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD FEEL " FRUSTRATED" BY THE MBFR PROJECT IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY DISTINCTION MADE BETWEEN U. S. AND OTHER STATIONED FORCES- CARE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN PRESENTING THIS FACTOR; (3) THERE SHOULD BE SOME MENTION OF BENELUX FORCES RATHER THAN SIMPLY REFERENCE TO A GEOGRAPHIC REDUCTION ZONE- HE SUGGESTED THAT THE EXPERTS SEEK WAYS TO COMBINE ELEMENTS OF THE U. S. OPTIONS.

4. IN REPLY, BAKER NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, FOR PRESENTATIONAL OR OTHER REASONS, TO CONSIDER COMBINING ELEMENTS AS LONG AS THE BASIC MBFR CRITERIA WERE PRESERVED. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED U. S. INTEREST IN CONTINUING FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE AND HOLDING THE SOVIETS TO THIS FOCUS IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE ANY EXPANSION OF THE NEGOTIATION TO OTHER AREAS WHICH WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR NATO.

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BAKER SUGGESTED THAT ONCE A PREFERRED OUTCOME IS SELECTED, NATO COULD ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF COMBINING ELEMENTS AND PRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE KIND ALLUDED TO BY DE STAERCKE. HE SAID U. S. WAS AWARE OF DANGERS OF BILATERALISM. BAKER NOTED THAT U. S. OUTLINE NEITHER PRESCRIBED NOR PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF OTHER STATIONED FORCES.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /153 W

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P 211920 Z MAY 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 172
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2966
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USDEL SALT TWO
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 2490

5. ON BASIS ON PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS, CATALANO (ITALY)
WARMLY WELCOMED U. S. APPROACH GENERALLY, SAID HIS AUTHORITIES
WERE PLEASED WITH ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY, REDUCTION OF ASYMMETRIES AND THE LIMITED SCOPE OF
REDUCTIONS PLANNED. ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ALSO APPROVED THE
CONCEPT OF INITIAL EMPHASIS ON STATIONED FORCES REDUCTION AND
THE FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE. CATALANO SAID HIS AUTHORITIES
FAVORED OPTION II, BUT FELT THAT NATO SHOULD DECIDE FOR ITSELF
HOW TO APPORTION REDUCTIONS WITHOUT GIVING SOVIETS A RIGHT TO
INTERFERE IN THIS DECISION AND WITHOUT DISCRIMINATING
AGAINST ANY NATO MEMBER.

6. KRAPF (FRG) PUT FOLLOWING QUESTIONS (1) ON PAGE 4, ITEM 1
OF U. S. PAPER WE HAD LISTED UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AS AN OBJECTIVE
AND THEN DISCUSSED SHORT RUN OBJECTIVES. ON PAGE 9 WE TALKED
ABOUT LONG TERM OBJECTIVES. HOW DID WE DEFINE EACH? DO WE
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REGARD OPTION I AS MEETING THE OBJECTIVE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY
IN THE SHORT TERM? (2) OPTION I RESULTS IN A COMMONG CEILING.
DO WE ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS CAN BE INDUCED TO ACCEPT THIS?
(3) THE U. S. HAS LISTED A CREDIBLE APPEAL TO OUR OWN PUBLIC
OPINION AS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MBFR. SHOULD THIS FACTOR NOT BE
INCLUDED IN THE GUIDELINES? (4) THE U. S. HAS USED FORCE LEVEL
FIGURES AT VARIANCE WITH NATO FIGURES. THE FRG PLANS TO SUBMIT
SOME QUESTIONS IN WRITING ON THIS POINT. (5) OPTION II RESULTS
IN A U. S. WITHDRAWAL OF SOME 33,000 MEN FROM THE CENTER REGION.
THIS WILL RESULT IN A 100 KM. GAP. WOULD IT STILL BE POSSIBLE
TO IMPLEMENT PRESENT NATO STRATEGY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES?
HOW AND WHY DID U. S. ARRIVE AT 10 PERCENT FIGURE FOR UPPER LIMIT ON
CUTS? ARE PHASES UNDER OPTION I REGARDED AS SEPARATE AND SUCCESSIVE?
WHY HAD WE PRESUMED THAT INDIGENOUS FORCE CUTS COULD BE PURSUED
AT A LATER DATE- WOULD THIS REALLY BE POSSIBLE? WOULD NEGOTIATIONS
ABOUT STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS CUTS TAKE PLACE MORE OR LESS
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE LATTER MERELY TO BE IMPLEMENTED LATER?
(6) HOW WOULD IMPLEMENTATION OF OPTIONS I OR II AFFECT ORGANIC
TACNUC SYSTEMS? WHAT WOULD BE THE RELATIVE NUCLEAR BALANCE IF

WE CONSIDERED OPTION III ALONG WITH I OR II? HAS THE U. S. CONSIDERED SOVIET NUCLEAR ARTILLERY CAPABILITIES?

7. REPLYING ON THE SHORT TERM- LONG TERM DISTINCTION, BAKER NOTED THAT U. S. WANTED TO AVOID THE " SLIPPERY SLOPE" OF AN OPEN- ENDED MBFR PROGRAM AND THAT WE THEREFORE SOUGHT FINITE, CALCULABLE OBJECTIVES. WE SAW OPTION I AS BEING IMPLEMENTED IN TWO STAGES, THEREFORE IT WOULD TAKE SOMEWHAT MORE TIME THAN OPTION II, BUT WAS STILL A FINITE OBJECTIVE. REGARDING ASYMMETRIES, BAKER NOTED THAT U. S. HAD TAILORED APPROACHES IN LIGHT OF NATO SECURITY INTERESTS. WE COULD NOT PREDICT SOVIET RESPONSES, BUT MUST IN ANY CASE CONFRONT SOVIETS WITH WHAT WERE NATO'S REAL SECURITY CONCERNS. BAKER SAID HE KNEW OF NO REASON WHY PUBLIC OPINION POINT COULD NOT BE ADDED TO GUIDELINES IF DESIRED.

8. REPLYING ON FORCE LEVEL QUESTIONS, COL. FULWYLER (US) REPLIED THAT CENTER REGION GAP WOULD HAVE TO BE COVERED BY SOME RE- STRUCTURING AND MOVEMENT OF FORCES BUT THAT THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF BASIC STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. RE 10 PERCENT LEVEL, FULWYLER NOTED THAT IN LIGHT OF U. S. ANALYSIS THIS APPEARED TO BE ABOUT THE BREAK- EVEN POINT; ANY HIGHER
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CUTS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT NATO SECURITY AND RELATIVE CAPABILITY. ON NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, HE REMINDED NAC THAT SOVIET WITHDRAWALS UNDER OPTION II WOULD RESULT IN SOMEWHAT REDUCED TARGETTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO SYSTEMS AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON NATO NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. HE ADDED THAT U. S. HAD CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ARTILLERY CAPABILITY AND CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON RELATIVE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN THEATRE. BAKER THAN ADDRESSED QUESTION OF FOLLOW- ON INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS, NOTING THAT ASYMMETRIES IN SECOND PHASE CUTS WOULD FAVOR SOVIETS AND WE COULD THEREFORE COUNT ON THEM WANTING TO PURSUE THIS PHASE. RE KRAPF'S QUESTION ON PHASING, BAKER NOTED THIS WAS POLICY QUESTION BEYOND EXPERTS' TERMS OF REFERENCE.

9. PECK (UK) SUPPORTED KRAPF'S INTEREST IN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN DIFFERING U. S. AND NATO FIGURES AND INSISTED WE WOULD NEED DEFENSIBLE AGREED DATA BASE IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE TO PROCEED AT ALL. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO USE UNITS OR TANKS FOR REDUCTION PURPOSES RATHER THAN MANPOWER FIGURES WHICH ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO AGREE AND TO VERIFY IN THE POST- REDUCTION PHASE. PECK ALSO ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECT ON SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF EACH U. S. OPTION- IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS WHAT WERE THE RELATIVE MERITS OF EACH OPTION FOR NATO AND WHAT WOULD BE THE PROBABLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO EACH APPROACH? IN REPLY, FULWYLER STATED THAT U. S. HAD USED BEST DATA AVAILABLE TO US AND HAD MADE SOME CHANGES IN DATA PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED, TAKING ACCOUNT, FOR EXAMPLE, HOF POST- VIETNAM ADJUSTMENTS AND INCLUDING GERMAN TERRITORIAL ARMY. ON WP DATA THERE WERE BOUND TO BE SOME AREAS

OF UNCERTAINTY BUT U. S. ANALYSTS REGARDED FIGURES AS
SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO PERMIT RELATIVISTIC FOCUS ON OUTCOMES.
ON MANPOWER VERSUS UNITS ISSUE, HE SAID U. S. PREFERRED THAT IN
NEGOTIATIONS NATO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SOVIET CUTS BY UNIT WHILE
KEEPING OPEN NATO OPTION FOR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. HE NOTED THAT
OPTION III HAD ATTEMPTED TO FOCUS ON TANKS AS MOST THREATENING
ELEMENT IN WP POSTURE. RE POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES, FULWYLER
OBSERVED THAT THESE WERE PROBABLY BEST LOOKED AT DURING
NEGOTIATING PHASE AND HAD NOT BEEN EXAMINED IN ANY DEPTH
SO FAR.

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ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /153 W

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P 211920 Z MAY 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 173

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 2967

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USDEL SALT TWO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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10. MENZIES (CANADA) SAID ALLIES SHOULD DEVELOP AN ESTIMATE OF
WHAT WARSAW PACT WILL SEEK AS OUTCOMES. IN ANNEX TO U. S. PAPER
HE HAD FOUND REFERENCES TO SOVIET AIMS- SUCH AS REMOVAL OF OR
DMINISHMENT OF ALLIED NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITY, WITHDRAWAL OF
U. S. FORCES, CEILING ON WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES, INHIBITIONS ON
QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN WESTERN FORCES AND A LEGAL BASIS FOR
INTERFERENCE IN WEST EUROPEAN DEFENSE AFFAIRS. HMENTZIES THOUGHT
ALLIES SHOULD ANALYZE SOVIET INCENTIVES IN MBFR, DEVELOP A PICTURE
OF REDUCTIONS SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE, AND CONSIDER
LIKELY SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE THREE U. S. OPTIONS. HE ASKED
WHETHER THE U. S. COULD PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS SHEDDING
LIGHT ON THESE QUESTIONS. IN THIS REGARD, SINCE IT WAS REPORTED
THAT BREZHNEV WOULD BE DISCUSSING MBFR DURING VISITS TO THE FRG

AND THE U. S., REPORTS ON THOSE MEETINGS WOULD IN CANADIAN VIEW BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL.

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11. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE U. S. PAPER, MENZIES ASKED HOW THE U. S. EXPECTED TO SELL TO THE EAST THE CONCEPT OF STOCKPILING OF WESTERN EQUIPMENT VS. WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT. LIKEWISE, HOW WOULD THE ALLIES CONVINCE THE SOVIETS TO REDUCE ITS UNITS WHILE NATO WOULD HAVE THE OPTION TO THIN ITS FORCES? A SEPARATE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE ALLIES COULD NOT " POOL " STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS UNDER THE FIRST OPTION. HE NOTED THAT THE U. S. HAD ALLOCATED THE SAME SPECIFIC PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS TO EACH ALLIED COUNTRY WITH STATIONED FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. WOULD THERE BE DIFFICULTIES IN HAVING THESE QUOTAS MADE INTERCHANGEABLE?

12. RE VERIFICATION, MENZIES SAID THE U. S. SEEMD TO CONCLUDE THAT ONLY NATIONAL MEANS WOULD BE NECESSARY. IT WAS REASSURING TO KNOW THAT U. S. CAPABILITIES WERE SO ADVANCED; POSSIBLY THE SOVIET HAD SIMILAR CAPABILITIES. BUT, MENZIES CONTINUED, INFORMATION FROM SUCH SOURCES COULD NOT READILY BE USED TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF OBSERVANCE OFPOTENTIAL AGREEMENTS. SHOULD THE ALLIES NOT MAKE CERTAIN OVERT MEASURES AN ESSENTIAL PART OF MBFR PACKAGE? IN THIS REGARD, MENZIES NOTED THAT SOME OF THE PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS LISTED BY THE U. S. WOULD BE HELPFUL.

13. RUMSFELD REASSURED MENZIES THAT THE U. S. WOULD KEEP ALLIES BRIEFED ON BREZHNEV VISIT. WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTENTIONS AND AIMS IN MBFR, ALLIES SHOULD INDEED ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN THE CONTEXT OF PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WOULD BE A LOGICAL NEXT STEP FOLLOWING ALLIED DECISION ON ACCEPTABLE OUTCOMES.

14. CHORAFAS (GREECE) EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH IMPORTANCE OF MENZIES QUESTION ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. RUMSFELD REITERATED THAT SUBJECTS OF ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME FOR MBFR SOVIET ATTITUDES AND NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND ITS NEGOTIABILITY ARE NATURALLY RELATED, BUT U. S. BELIEVES THAT NAC SHOULD FIRST OF ALL ADDRESS WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF MILITARY SECURITY. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) AGREED WITH RUMSFELD, AND ACTING SYG SAID THAT NAC COULD RETURN LATER TO QUESTIONS OF NEGOTIABILITY. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS), HOWEVER, PURUSUED SUBJECT, POINTING OUT THAT NAC SHOULD NOT BE WASTING ITS TIME ON OUTCOMES THAT ARE CLEARLY NOT NEGOTIABLE. RUMSFELD SAID THIS POINT WAS UNDERSTOOD, BUT STARTING POINT FOR DISCUSSION SHOULD BE WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE

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BY AGREED CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED MILITARY SECURITY, HNOT WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE MERELY BECUASE IT IS NEGOTIABLE WITH SOVIETS.

15. MENZIES ASKED U. S. EXPERTS TO RESTATE RATIONALE FOR U. S. OPPOSITION TO AN INITIAL FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT (FLA) (ANNEX C OF U. S. PAPER). FULWYLER (U. S.) REPLIED THAT FLA WOULD TEND TO IMPEDE ALLIED NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE IN SEEKING TO REDRESS MILITARY ASYMMETRIES- I. E., IT WOULD IMPLY THAT ALLIES ACCEPT EAST- WEST " BALANCE" AS IT NOW STANDS.

16. AFTER DETERMINING THAT THERE WERE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS FOR NAC, ACTING SYG PROPOSED THAT SENIOR POLADS AND WORKING GROUP REPS CONVENE IN AFTERNOON WITH EXPERTS FOR CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF OUTCOMES IN U. S. PAPER. DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING AN ALLIED MBFR POSITION FORWARDED BY SENIOR POLADS ON MAY 17 (USNATO 2461 AND 2462) WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN NAC ON MAY 23. HE THANKED U. S. EXPERTS FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DISCUSSION, AND WELCOMED THEIR AVAILABILITY FOR BILATERAL OR GROUP MEETINGS THROUGH MAY 24 TO PURSUE MORE DETAILED QUESTIONS. RUMSFELD

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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
SALT TWO
HELSINKI
VIENNA

MOSCOW

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